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Abstract
We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoﬀs depend
on the structure of the network. We focus on games where players may promise or de-
mand transfer payments when forming links. If players may only make such transfers on
the links they are directly involved with, then there are many settings where ineﬃcient
networks are the only equilibrium outcomes, and we fully characterize the supportable
networks. If externalities are nonpositive and a convexity condition is satisﬁed, then
eﬃcient networks are supportable as equilibria with such direct transfers. If players
can also make positive transfers to pay for links they are not involved with, then a
convexity condition alone is suﬃcient for an eﬃcient network to be supportable as an
equilibrium. In cases where transfers can be made contingent on the network, then
any eﬃcient network is supportable as an equilibrium. We also consider a reﬁnement
of equilibrium that allows pairs of players to coordinate their promises and demands
on a link. If players can make payments to prevent the formation of a link as well
as to form it, then all eﬃcient networks are supportable via the pairwise equilibrium
reﬁnement.
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11 Introduction
Many social, economic, and political relationships may be thought of as a network of bilateral
relationships. This ranges fromfriendships to trading relationships to political alliances. As
the structure of the network of relationships can have a profound impact on the welfare of
all the involved parties, it is essential to develop a good understanding of which networks
are likely to formand how this depends on the speciﬁcs of the circum stances. This paper
contributes to a growing literature that models network formation.1
Our purpose in what follows is twofold. First, we wish to provide models that will help
us to study network formation when the players involved can bargain on possible transfers
at the time of forming relationships. For example, when two airlines form a code-sharing
agreement, included in that agreement are details on how to split the costs and revenues on
cross-booked passengers. Without some transfer payments (in currency or in kind), many
such agreements would never exist. This is true in wide variety of network settings, and so we
develop models where the formation of links and the agreement over transfers are agreed to
at the same time. Second, we wish to understand how the formation of networks depends on
the types of transfers that are allowed. For instance, in many settings one player’s welfare
might depend on how other players are linked. When is it important that a player can
make transfers that are contingent on the relationships that another player has? When is
it important for players to be able to subsidize relationships between other players? As the
formation process and the types of transfers that might be feasible varies with the setting,
having an idea of how network formation depends on these aspects of the formation process
will help us understand which networks we should expect to see.
This paper ﬁts into a recent literature that examines network formation when players act
in their own interest and their payoﬀs may depend on the structure of the network. In such
contexts, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) showed that the networks that maximize society’s
overall payoﬀ will often not be stable in an equilibriumsense, regardless of how payoﬀs
are re-allocated (subject to some basic conditions). Their perspective was one where the
allocation of payoﬀs is already set as a function of the network when players decide which
links to form. They showed that were simple settings such that, for any allocation of payoﬀs
satisfying an anonymity and component balance condition, the networks that were formed
by individuals would fail to maximize overall societal welfare. While they also showed that
there are a variety of settings where link formation will lead to eﬃcient networks, their
result is still bothersome in that even the ability to reallocate payoﬀs fairly widely does not
overcome diﬃculties with network externalities (even with complete information).
In recent papers, Currarini and Morelli (2001) and Mutuswami and Winter (2002) show
that, at least in some settings, the diﬃculty of eﬃcient network formation can be overcome
if players bargain over the allocation of payoﬀs at the same time as the network forms. They
model network formation as a sequential process where players move in turn and announce
the payoﬀ that they demand and the links that they are willing form. The network that
forms as a function of the announcements is the largest one such that the demands are
1See Jackson (2003b) for a survey of the literature that is most closely related to our work here.
2compatible with the value that is generated. They show that the equilibria of such games
are eﬃcient networks, assuming that there are no externalities across network components
and that some payoﬀ conditions are satisﬁed. Part of the intuition is that by moving in
sequence and making such take it or leave it demands, players can extract their marginal
contribution to an eﬃcient network, and this provides correct incentives.
These papers make an important point that the ability to determine payoﬀs in conjunc-
tion with link formation may aid in the emergence of eﬃcient networks. However, these
sequential games have special features and are better for illustrating the importance of tak-
ing such bargaining seriously, than for providing reasonable models of network formation.
In particular, the end-gaming and ﬁnite extensive forms drive the results. Moreover, Cur-
rarini and Morelli (2001) and Mutuswami and Winter (2002) provide some conditions for
the support of eﬃcient networks, but do not give us much of a feel for how generally this
might hold, or how this depends on the structure of the process.
Here, we take the important message from these papers that a simultaneous determination
of payoﬀs and link structure can be a critical determinant of which networks form. However,
we take a very diﬀerent approach to modeling these issues, both in the class of games that
we consider, and the types of questions that we ask. First, in order to ﬁnd games that
have some robust structure to them, we look at simultaneous move games. While arguably
network formation is generally far from simultaneous, these games have a critical feature
that is absent from the ﬁnite extensive forms. In particular, once the network has formed,
no player(s) would beneﬁt from changing their promised or demanded transfers and the links
that they form. If one added further stages to the ﬁnite extensive forms and allowed players
to come back to revisit their actions, the outcomes would change dramatically. As when
whatever network formation process reaches some sort of stable point, it should be that no
player could gain from some further deviation, the simultaneous move games capture this
quite directly. Second, we try to develop a fuller characterization of the networks that can
be supported and how this varies with the structure of the externalities and players’ payoﬀs.
Third, we tie the type of transfer that is available in the game to the type of networks
that are supportable. We compare the networks that emerge when players can only make
payments with regards to links that they are involved with, to those networks that emerge
when players can subsidize the formation of links that they are not directly involved with.
We also study how the ability to make payments contingent on the whole architecture of
the network aﬀects network formation. The support of eﬃcient networks ties back to these
variations in game structure in intuitive ways relating to the type of externalities present,
and the convexity (or lack thereof) of the payoﬀs. As diﬀerent applications tend to have




3The set N = {1,...,n} is the set of players.2
An e t w o r kg is a list of which pairs of players are linked to each other. A network is then
a list of unordered pairs of players {i,j}.
For any pair of players i and j, {i,j}∈g indicates that i and j are linked under the
network g.
For simplicity, we write ij to represent the link {i,j},a n ds oij ∈ g indicates that i and
j are linked under the network g.
For instance, if N = {1,2,3} then g = {12,23} is the network where there is a link
between players 1 and 2, a link between players 2 and 3, but no link between players 1 and
3.
Let gN be the set of all subsets of N of size 2. The network gN is referred to as the
“complete” network.
G = {g ⊂ gN} denotes the set of all possible networks on N.
For any network g ∈ G,l e tN(g) be the set of players who have at least one link in the
network g.T h a ti s ,N(g)={i |∃ j s.t.i j∈ g}.
Given a player i ∈ N and a network g ∈ G,l e tLi(g) denote the set of links in g involving
player i, Li(g)={jk ∈ g|j = io rk= i}.
Paths and Components
A path in a network g ∈ G between players i and j is a sequence of players i1,...,i K
such that ikik+1 ∈ g for each k ∈{ 1,...,K− 1},w i t hi1 = i and iK = j.
Looking at the path relationships in a network naturally partitions a network into diﬀerent
connected subnetworks that are commonly referred to as components.
A component of a network g, is a nonempty subnetwork g  ⊂ g, such that
• if i ∈ N(g )a n dj ∈ N(g )w h e r ej  = i, then there exists a path in g  between i and j,
and
• if i ∈ N(g )a n dij ∈ g,t h e nij ∈ g .
Thus, the components of a network are the distinct connected subnetworks of a network.
Utility Functions
The utility of a network to player i is given by a function ui : G → I R+.L e tu denote
the vector of functions u =( u1,...,u n),
W en o r ma l i z ep a y o ﬀ ss ot h a t ui(∅)=0 .
For any network g ∈ G and subset of links   ⊂ g,l e t
mui(g, )=ui(g) − ui(g \  )
be the marginal utility for player i fromthe links   relative to the network g.
Externalities
2For background and discussion of the model of networks discussed here, see Jackson (2003b).
4The class of utility functions that we consider here is arbitrary, and thus considers very
general types of externalities. At times, it is useful to talk about speciﬁc forms of externali-
ties. To that end, the following deﬁnitions of externalities in payoﬀs are useful.
The proﬁle of utility functions u satisﬁes no externalities if ui(g)=ui(g + jk) for all g,
jk / ∈ g,a n di/ ∈ jk.
The proﬁle of utility functions u satisﬁes nonpositive externalities if ui(g) ≥ ui(g + jk)
for all g, jk / ∈ g,a n di/ ∈ jk.
The proﬁle of utility functions u satisﬁes nonnegative externalities if ui(g) ≤ ui(g + jk)
for all g, jk / ∈ g, i/ ∈ jk.
These deﬁnitions of externalities are not exhaustive. There are some settings that do not
satisfy any of the above cases, as it may be that some links result in positive externalities
and others in negative externalities, or the nature of the externality may diﬀer depending on
the players in question and/or the starting network. Nevertheless, these deﬁnitions capture
many settings of interest and prove useful in talking about some interesting special cases in
what follows.
Values and Eﬃciency






An e t w o r kg ∈ G Pareto dominates an e t w o r kg  ∈ G relative to u if ui(g) ≥ ui(g ) for
all i ∈ N, with strict inequality for at least one i ∈ N.
An e t w o r kg ∈ G is Pareto eﬃcient relative to u if it is not Pareto dominated.
An e t w o r kg ∈ G is eﬃcient relative to u if it maximizes vu(g).
In a world where transfers are possible, eﬃciency and Pareto eﬃciency (allowing for
transfers) are equivalent. Thus, our main focus here is on eﬃcient networks.3
3 Network Formation Games
We consider several models of network formation where various types of transfers are
available, and examine which networks emerge as equilibria and how that depends on the
structure of transfers. There are two basic versions of the game that we consider which diﬀer
as to whether players can make transfers on links that do not involve them. Later, we also
consider variations of these games when transfers can be contingent on the network that
forms. Thus, we consider four main variations of network formation games.
3For a detailed discussion of various notions of eﬃcient networks in the presence of transfers, see Jackson
(2003a).
5The Direct Transfer Network Formation Game
Every player i ∈ N announces a vector of transfers ti ∈ I Rn−1. We denote the entries in
this vector by ti
ij,a c r o s st h en − 1 potential links that involve i. The announcements are
simultaneous.
Link ij is formed if and only if ti
ij+t
j
ij ≥ 0. Formally, the network that forms as a function













The interpretation is that a player announces a transfer for each possible link that he
or she might form. If the transfer is positive, then it represents the amount that the player
promises to pay to the other player involved in that link. If the transfer is negative, then it
represents the amount that the player must receive in order to be willing to form the given
link.
It is conceivable in this game that ti
ij + t
j
ij > 0. Here, we hold both players to their
promises. For instance, if ti
ij > −t
j
ij > 0, then player i ends up making a bigger payment
than player j demanded. Player j only gets his or her demand, and the excess payment is
wasted. In equilibrium, this will never arise as either player would beneﬁt from deviating.
As will become clear, the game would work equally well if we simply made the transfer in
this case either the max or the min of the two promises/demands; as regardless of how this
is speciﬁed equilibrium will imply that the two will exactly match in equilibrium whenever
they are compatible. The same is true of the other games we consider.
The Indirect Transfer Network Formation Game
Every player i announces a vector of transfers ti ∈ I R(n−1)!. We denote the entries in the
vector ti by ti
jk, as varying across all possible links jk.
It is required that if i/ ∈ jk,t h e nti
jk ≥ 0. Thus, i can make demands on the links that
i is involved with (it is permissible to have ti
ij < 0), but can only make promises to pay for
links that i is not directly involved with.
Link jk is formed if and only if

i∈N ti
jk ≥ 0. Formally, the network that forms as a














6The variation of this link formation game from the previous one is that players are also
allowed to make promises to pay to help support links that they are not directly involved in.
That is, player i may promise to contribute a payment ti
jk for the formation of link jk.T h e
restriction that they can only subsidize links that they are not involved with reﬂects that
feature that a player cannot prevent other agents from forming links among themselves, but
can subsidize such link formation.
Network Formation Games with Contingent Transfers
In the games we have deﬁned above, players only have a limited ability to condition
their actions on the actions of other players. That is, the games do not allow players to say
something of the form: “I will pay you to form link ij, but only if link jk is also formed.”
It turns out that being able to make this kind of contingent promise is very important.
To this end, we consider a variation of each of the above games for the case where a
player can make their promises/demands contingent on the network that forms.
Thus, i announces a vector ti(g)c o n t i n g e n to ng forming, for each conceivable nonempty
g ∈ G. In the direct transfer game, ti(g) ∈ I Rn−1 for each i, while
There are many possible ways to determine which network forms given a set of contingent
announcements. We pick one, but it will become very clear that the results are robust to
this choice. There is an ordering over G, that is captured by a function σ which maps G
onto {1,...,#G}. The network that forms is then determined as follows. First look at g1
such that σ(g1) = 1. Look at the proﬁle of transfers t(g1). Look at g(t(g1)). If g(t(g1)) = g1
then stop. Otherwise, continue to g2. Stop at the ﬁrst k such that g(t(gk)) = gk.I ft h e r ei s
no such k, then the empty network forms.
This deﬁnes the network that forms as a function of announced proﬁle of contingent
transfers, which we again denote g(t), with the understanding that t is now simply a larger
vector that includes payments in all sorts of contingencies. The payoﬀs to the players are
then as before, using the vector of transfers t(g(t)).
Equilibrium and Supporting a Network















in a contingent game.
4This equation includes ti
jk, even when i/ ∈ jk, and such transfers are not included in the direct transfer
game. Simply set ti
jk = 0 when i/ ∈ jk for the direct transfer game.
7A vector t forms an equilibrium of one of the above games if it is a pure strategy Nash
equilibriumof the gam e. That is, t is an equilibriumif
π(t) ≥ π(t−i,  t
i),
for all i and  ti.
We say that a network g is supported via a given game relative to a proﬁle of utility
functions u =( u1,...,u n) if there exists an equilibrium t of the game such that g(t)=g.
A Comment on Simultaneous Move Games
A critical advantage of considering a simultaneous version of network formation is that
after seeing the resulting network and transfers, players will not wish to make further changes
to their transfers and links. This is not true if one instead models network formation sequen-
tially, by having the players move in some order. It could be that the resulting network and
transfers would not be stable if players could then come back and make further changes.
Regardless of whether one thinks that network formation is simultaneous, the conditions
imposed by equilibrium are necessary conditions for any process to come to a stable position.
That is, the equilibriumconditions that are derived here are conditions that capture the idea
that we have arrived at a network such that no players would gain fromfurther changes.
A Reﬁnement: Pairwise Equilibrium
There is one issue introduced by the simultaneity of the link formation game. It allows
for a multiplicity of equilibrium networks as a result of a coordination failure. This is easily
overcome with any of a variety of simple reﬁnements, as we now discuss.
Example 1 Why reﬁne?






Note that there are two supported networks. One is the empty network and the other
is complete network (one link). For instance, to support the complete network we can set
t1
12 = t2
12 = 0. To support the empty network, we can set t1
12 = t2
12 = −t,w h e r et ≥ 1. The
second equilibriumis one in which the link is not form ed because both players expect the
8other to make an unreasonable demand, and so it is a best response for each them to make
unreasonable demands.
Note that this second equilibrium supporting the empty network survives an elimination
of weakly dominated strategies and is also a trembling hand perfect equilibrium.5 To elim-
inate this equilibrium using standard reﬁnements would require the machinery of iterative
elimination of strategies, which is cumbersome in games with a continuum of actions.
Alternatively, we should expect players forming a link to be able to coordinate their
actions on that formation, as the real-life process that we are modeling would generally
already involve some form of direct communication. This suggests a very simple reﬁnement.




A vector t forms is a pairwise equilibrium of one of the above games if it is an equilibrium
of the game, and there does not exist any ij / ∈ g(t), and  t such that




(2) πj(t−ij,  ti
ij,  t
j
ij) ≥ πj(t), and
(3) at least one of (1) or (2) holds strictly.6
This reﬁnement asks whether or not there are any two agents who have not formed a
link, who could beneﬁt from mutually changing their demands/promises to add a link.
Note that the reason the reﬁnement only worries about the addition of links is that players
can already unilaterally sever links (simply by increasing their demands) and so equilibrium
already captures the essential features of that case.7
Example 2 Nonexistence of Pairwise Equilibria
As opposed to pure strategy Nash equilibria which always exist for all of the games we
have discussed, there are some settings in which pairwise equilibria do not exist. Here is
such an example. Each player gets 0 in the empty network.
5Demanding −t fares well in the case where the other agent happens to oﬀer at least t.
6This is easily seen to be equivalent to requiring that both (1) and (2) hold strictly.
7There are many other reﬁnements we could also consider - for instance in the indirect transfer game
allowing all agents to change their t’s on a given link. Once one allows for such group deviations, it makes
sense to go all the way to allowing more general groups deviations. At that point one is led to something that
is equivalent to the concept of strongly stability with side payments of Jackson and van den Nouweland (2001).
Such a reﬁnement is quite stringent, and while it has the nice property of only supporting eﬃcient networks,






















































































The empty network is a (pure strategy Nash) equilibrium, but not a pairwise equilibrium:
two players can set zero demands to form a link and get 1 > 0. No network that has at
least two links can be an equilibrium. Any such network must have some player who gets
a negative payoﬀ, who can then get a payoﬀ of at least 0 by setting negative transfers on
both links (below -3). Finally, a network with one link cannot be a pairwise equilibrium.
For example, if the player who is not linked demanded −3.5 and a player who already has
one link oﬀered 3.5, both players would beneﬁt.
4 The Direct Transfer Game
We now provide an analysis of the simplest game, and the one that might best capture the
type of direct bargaining that we expect to arise in many applications: the direct transfer
network formation game.
10We ﬁrst provide an example that shows that there exist utility functions for which the
eﬃcient network is not supported by any equilibriumin the direct transfer gam e.





All other networks result in a utilities of 0 for all players.
Consider any equilibrium t and resulting network g(t). It must be that t3
23 ≤− 1i ft h e
network {12,23} = g(t), as otherwise 3 would beneﬁt by lowering t3.I ft2
23 ≥ 1 ≥− t3
23,t h e n
2 will beneﬁt by lowering t2
23, regardless of what other links have formed as u2 is 0 for all
networks. Thus, the network {12,23} cannot be supported in equilibrium.
This example shows us that the set of networks that can be supported via the network
formation game with direct transfers will have some limitations and that only in some cases
will eﬃcient networks be supported. More generally, it points out that we will need in-
direct transfers in order to support eﬃcient networks in some situations where there are
externalities.
Let us get a fuller understanding of what networks can be supported as equilibria under
the network formation game with direct transfers. While Example 3 suggests that direct
transfers may not always handle externalities, there are hurdles which go even beyond this.
Even in cases without externalities, the game must account for payoﬀs from many diﬀerent
possible deviations in terms of sets of links that might be deleted.
Example 4 The Eﬃcient Network is Not Supportable in the Complete Absence of Exter-
nalities.
Consider a three-player society and a proﬁle of utility functions described as follows. Any
player gets a payoﬀ of 0 if he or she does not have any links. Player 1 gets a payoﬀ of 2 if
she has exactly one link, and a payoﬀ of 1 if she has two links. Player 2 gets a payoﬀ of -2
if he has exactly one link, and a payoﬀ of 0 if he has two links. Player 3’s payoﬀ function is
s i mi l a rt ot h a to fp l a y e r2 :h eg e t sap a y o ﬀo f- 2i fh eh a se x a c t l yo n el i n k ,a n dap a y o ﬀo f
0i fh eh a st w ol i n k s .
It is clear fromthis speciﬁcation that all players’ payoﬀs depend only on the conﬁguration
of their own links and so there are absolutely no externalities in payoﬀs. This payoﬀ structure



























































































Let us check that there is no equilibriumof the direct transfer gam e that supports the
unique eﬃcient network (the complete network). By setting t2
2i ≤ 0 for each i,p l a y e r2g e t s
a payoﬀ of at least 0. The same is true for player 3. Thus, players 2 and 3 must have a payoﬀ
of at least 0 in any equilibrium. Now, suppose that the complete network were supported in
an equilibrium. It follows that t1
1i ≥ 0 for at least one i, or otherwise one of players 2 and 3
12would have a negative payoﬀ. Without loss of generality, say that t1
12 ≥ 0. Player 1’s payoﬀ
is 1−t1
12−t1
13. Suppose that player 1 deviates and changes t1
12 so that t1
12+t2
12 < 0. Then the
network that forms will be 12,23 and player 1’s payoﬀ is then 2 − t1




12 ≥ 0). This is a contradiction, and so the complete network cannot be
supported by any equilibrium.
This example is quite damaging to the hopes of sustaining eﬃcient networks via the direct
transfer game. The example is a bit unexpected (by us, at least) in the following sense. If
there are no externalities in the network at all, then the value generated can be attributed
directly to the links themselves and only aﬀects the players involved in those links. In such
a situation, at ﬁrst glance, it would seemthat the players involved in any given link could
make transfers that support that link in situations where the total marginal beneﬁt from
that link are positive. What is missing from this reasoning is that a given player might
have many diﬀerent combinations of links that they might consider deleting. Each of these
combinations might require diﬀerent transfers to support the links. Indeed, this is the heart
of the network balance condition. It might be that some of these combinations are in conﬂict
with each other. In the above example, it is the possibilities that either player 2 or 3 might
sever both of his or her links that lies in conﬂict with what player 1 can get by severing a
single link at a time.
This gives us an idea of what characteristics a link formation process must have in order
to always support eﬃcient networks. Two things will be needed. First, indirect transfers are
needed in order to take care of externalities, as suggested Example 3. Second, Example 4
suggests that we will also need the transfers to be contingent on the network that is formed.
In that way the transfers can adjust to the particular combination of links that are formed.
We come back to investigate contingencies more fully below.
While Examples 3 and 4 suggest that the direct transfer game will fall short of support-
ing eﬃcient network in two important regards, there are still many setting with externalities
and/or complementarities among links where eﬃcient networks are supported as the equi-
libria of the direct transfer network formation game.
We now provide a characterization of the networks that are supportable in games with
direct transfers, and identify some settings where direct transfers suﬃce to support eﬃcient
networks. First, we oﬀer the complete characterization.
A Complete Characterization of Networks Supported by Direct Transfers: The
Network Balance Condition
A set of nonnegative weights {µi











for each ij ∈ g.







 mui(g, ) ≥ 0.
for every balanced vectors of weights.
We should emphasize that the balance conditions identiﬁed here are quite diﬀerent from
the balance conditions used in cooperative game theory. These are not weights that are
balanced across coalitions and agents, but equal across particular player-link pairs. These
are tailored to the pairwise considerations in network formation, as they should be.
Proposition 1 A network g is supportable as an equilibriumof the direct transfer network
formation game relative to the proﬁle of utility functions u if and only if it is balanced relative
to the proﬁle of utility functions u.
The proof of Proposition 1 appears in the appendix. As one might expect, it uses duality
theory from linear programming to turn the equilibrium support conditions into a set of
balance conditions.
Proposition 1 only characterizes supportability, and not supportability via pairwise equi-
librium. Clearly this provides necessary, but not suﬃcient conditions for supportability via
pairwise equilibrium. The additional constraints imposed by pairwise equilibrium seem to be
diﬃcult to capture in a balance sort of condition. Nevertheless, we can identify a suﬃcient
condition, as follows.
Proposition 2 If a network g is supportable via pairwise equilibriumby the direct transfer
network formation, then it is balanced relative to the proﬁle of utility functions u. Conversely,
if u satisﬁes nonnegative externalities, and g is eﬃcient and balanced relative to u,t h e ng is
supportable via pairwise equilibrium by the direct transfer network formation game.
More generally, we show the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If g is eﬃcient and supportable via the direct or indirect transfer game, and u
satisﬁes nonnegative externalities, then g is supportable in pairwise equilibrium.
While the balance conditions are not so obviously interpreted directly, they turn out
to be quite useful as is illustrated in the following identiﬁcation of suﬃcient conditions for
supportability.
Distance-Based Payoﬀs and Stars
Let d(i,j) denote the distance between i and j in terms of the number of links in the
shortest path between them(setting d(i,j)=∞ if there is no path).





for all i,w h e r ec ≥ 0 is a cost per link, and f is a nonincreasing function.
A distance-based payoﬀ structure is one where players may get beneﬁts from indirect
connections, but where those beneﬁts are determined by the shortest paths. Special cases
of distance-based payoﬀs are the connections model and truncated connections models of
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). In such settings, “star” networks play a very central role, as
captured in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If u is distance-based, then the unique eﬃcient network structure is
(i) the complete network gN if c<f(1) − f(2),
(ii) a star encompassing all players if f(1) − f(2) <c<f(1) +
(n−2)f(2)
2 ,a n d
(iii) the empty network if f(1) +
(n−2)f(2)
2 .
In the case where c is equal to f(1) − f(2) or f(1) +
(n−2)f(2)
2 , there are can be a variety
of network structures that are eﬃcient. Nevertheless, the star is still eﬃcient in those cases.
The proof of Proposition 3 is an easy extension of the proof of a Proposition in Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996), but we include it in the appendix for completeness.
Distance-based settings are ones where eﬃcient networks turn out to be supportable,
and via pairwise equilibrium. Even though there are externalities, say in a star network, any
player i who enjoys externalities is directly connected to the center who is responsible for
providing those externalities. This allows players to pass on their beneﬁts to the center, and
helps in supporting the star as an equilibrium. This is captured in the following corollary to
Propositions 1 and 2.
Corollary 1 If u is distance-based, then some eﬃcient network is supportable via the
direct transfer game and is also supportable via pairwise equilibrium.
The claim is easy to see directly in cases where either the empty or complete networks are
eﬃcient. Consider the remaining case where f(1)−f(2) ≤ c ≤ f(1)+
(n−2)f(2)
2 , and thus a star
involving all players is eﬃcient. Here, we verify the balance conditions. An agent i connected
to the center j in a star has only one link, we can simply set µi
{ij} = c for any c ≥ 0. Then
for the center j, it must be that

 ⊂Lj(g):ij∈  µ
j
  = c. The fact that a star is balanced then
follows fromnoting that cmui(g,ij)+cµj(g,ij)=2 f(1)+(n−2)f(2)−2c ≥ 0i ns i t u a t i o n s
where the star is eﬃcient, and noting that the center’s payoﬀ is additively separable across
15links.8 Proposition 2 implies that we can support an eﬃcient g as a pairwise equilibrium,
noting that there are nonnegative externalities in a distance-based u (as adding a link that
does not involve i can only increase i’s payoﬀ as it may decrease the distance between i and
some other agent, but does not impose a cost on i)
Supportability with Nonpositive Externalities and Convexity in Own-Links
In looking for other suﬃcient conditions for supportability, Examples 3 and 4 are helpful.
Examples 3 suggests that we should look at situations where externalities are nonpositive.
Example 4 suggests a restriction that marginal payoﬀs from a given set of links be at least
as high as the sum of the marginal payoﬀs from separate links. This condition is formalized
as follows.





for all i, g,a n d  ⊂ Li(g).
Under these two conditions eﬃcient networks are supportable, as stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 If utility functions are convex in own-links and satisfy nonpositive exter-
nalities, then any eﬃcient network g is supportable via the direct transfer game. If utility
functions are convex in own links and satisfy no externalities, then g is supportable via a
pairwise equilibrium.
As an example of a setting where we might see convexity in own-links and nonpositive
externalities, consider some sort of research partnerships between ﬁrms in an oligopoly. For
instance, an agreement might lead to the lowering of cost by a ﬁrm. If there are diminishing
returns to entering into more such relationships, then the convexity in own-links is satisﬁed.
The nonpositive externalities arise as agreements between other ﬁrms lowers rivals’ costs.
[[Elaborate on this example.]]
A special case of convexity in own links, is the case where payoﬀs are separable across
links.
Link-Separable Payoﬀs
Let us say that payoﬀs are link-separable, if for each player i there exists a vector wi ∈






8This also gives us an idea of which transfers support a star as an equilibrium with agent 1 as the center.
Setting ti
1i = f(1) + (n − 2)f(2) − c, ti
ji = −(n − 1)f(1) for j>1, and t1
1i = −[f(1) + (n − 2)f(2) − c]f o r
each i. It is easily seen that these form an equilibrium that supports the star.
16This condition states that agents view relationships completely separately. A special case
is where they only care about the value of their own links.
Corollary 2 If payoﬀs are link-separable and have nonpositive externalities, then any ef-
ﬁcient network g is supportable via the direct transfer game. Furthermore, if payoﬀs are
link-separable and have no externalities, then g is supportable via a pairwise equilibriumif
and only if g is eﬃcient.
The ﬁrst statement and ﬁrst part of the second statement follow from Proposition 4. To
see the only if claim, suppose to the contrary that g is supportable via a pairwise equilibrium
but not eﬃcient. Then there exists g  such that

i ui(g ) >

i ui(g). As payoﬀs are link
separable and have no externalities, either there exists ij ∈ g\g  such that wiij + wjij < 0
or there exists ij ∈ g \g and wiij + wjij > 0. In the ﬁrst case, g cannot be supported as
an equilibrium, because one of the two players has an incentive to increase her demanded
transfer thereby severing the link; in the second case, g cannot be supported as a pairwise
equilibrium, since will exist a pair of compatible transfer such that the players have an
incentive formthe link.
While the above Proposition and Corollary show us that if externalities are nonpositive
and payoﬀs are convex in own-links, then the direct transfer game suﬃces to support eﬃcient
networks; we should emphasize we have also seen that there are also some situations that
move beyond this where direct transfers still suﬃce to support eﬃcient networks. As we have
seen in Corollary 1, there are interesting classes where transfers support eﬃcient networks
even though both convexity in own-links and nonpositive externalities are violated.
5 Indirect Transfers
As we have seen above, cases where there are positive externalities can make it impossible to
support an eﬃcient network via a network formation game with direct transfers. Allowing for
indirect transfers will help support eﬃcient networks in situations where there are positive
externalities, as players can agree to subsidize links that would indirectly beneﬁt them.
While moving to the game with indirect transfers helps us in this way, a diﬀerent “convexity”
problemarises. In the indirect transfer gam e convexity in own-links is no longer enough to
overcome the diﬃculty faced in terms of aﬀecting several links at once, as a player’s deviation
(for instance lowering a subsidy) can result in the severance of links not involving that player.
This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 5 Eﬃcient Network are not Supportable with Indirect Transfers and Convexity in
Own-Links
17Consider a three-player society with payoﬀs as pictured for networks of one or more links,






















































































The complete network is eﬃcient but is not the outcome of any equilibrium of the indirect
transfer network formation game. Let us sketch the argument. Consider any player i.P l a y e r
i must oﬀer to subsidize the link jk by an amount of at least .4, as otherwise at least one of
j and k will have an incentive to “sever” the link (set their demand to no more than −.2).
Find some player i and a link ij such that ti
ij ≥ 0. Such a link must exist if the complete
network is supported. Consider the following deviation: player i reduces the payment on the
link jk and “severs” link ij (setting ti
ij to be low enough so that ij does not form). In that
case, the only link formed is link ik, and player i’s base payoﬀ is the increased, and transfers
have decreased which is strict improvement for player i.
The above network is convex in own-links, as the marginal utility of any second own-
link is negative while the marginal utility of any set of two own-links is always positive.
18However, note that the convexity in links fails more generally. The marginal utility to player
1 at the complete network of the links 12,23 is negative, while the marginal utility of 23 at
the complete network is 1.1, and the marginal utility of 12 is -.2, so the sum of the marginal
utilities is positive. Indeed, this is the source of the problemin the exam ple
Convexity in All Links





for all i, g,a n da n y  ⊂ g.
We can now state the following proposition.
Proposition 5 If payoﬀs are convex in all links, then any eﬃcient network g is support-
able via the indirect transfer game. If payoﬀs also have nonnegative externalities, then g is
supportable via pairwise equilibrium.
A prominent example where these conditions are satisﬁed is that of trading networks.
Imagine that a group of players (possibly individuals, ﬁrms, countries) are involved in bi-
lateral trading or risk-sharing relationships, where gains fromtrade m ay pass through the
network. This leads to nonnegative externalities. Also, the marginal beneﬁt of adding a new
trader decreases in the number already connected, so that payoﬀs are convex in all links.
[[elaborate on this example.]]
6 Network Contingent Transfers
While the ability of players to make indirect transfers helps in supporting networks, there
are still convexity conditions that are necessary to support eﬃcient networks. We now
move to exploring contingent transfers to see how that helps. We do this in two parts:
ﬁrst, considering contingent transfers together with direct transfers, and second, considering
contingent transfers together with indirect transfers. Let us start with direct transfers.
Let us look back at the reason that the network in Example 3 could not be formed in
the direct transfer game. Here, player 1 would like to subsidize the formation of the link 23.
However, that is not permitted if transfers can only ﬂow along links. Thus, we saw that the
network could not be supported as an equilibriumof the direct transfer gam e, but could be
supported as an equilibriumof the indirect transfer gam e.
However, we might also consider another possibility. Player 1 might make transfers to
player 2, which are then passed on to player 3. The diﬃculty is that if player 1 makes this
transfer to player 2, then player 2 might as well not form the link with player 3 and keep
19the transfer. This can be rectiﬁed if transfers can be made contingent on the network that
forms.
As we see now, allowing transfers to be contingent on the network that forms has a big
impact on the set of networks that can be supported as equilibrium networks, even when
only direct transfers are possible.
Proposition 6 Consider the contingent version of the direct transfer game and any u.
There exists an equilibriumwhere the network g is formed and the payoﬀs are y ∈ Ren where




i∈N(g ) yi for all g  ∈ C(g),a n d
yi  = ui(g) implies i ∈ N(g).
Corollary 3 Consider the contingent version of the direct transfer game. Consider any
u and network g such that

i∈N(g ) ui(g) ≥ 0 for all components g  ∈ C(g). There exists an
equilibriumsupporting g. Moreover, there is an equilibriumcorresponding to each allocation




i∈N(g ) yi for each g  ∈ C(g) and yi = ui(g) or yi < 0
implies i/ ∈ N(g).
While Proposition 6 provides for a very wide set of networks to be supported as equilibria,
it is limited by the fact that transfers cannot ﬂow across separate components of a network
in the direct transfer game, even if payments are contingent. If we allow for such indirect
transfers, then there are additional networks that can be supported.9
Proposition 7 Consider the contingent version of the indirect transfer network formation
game. Consider any u, any network g, and any allocation y ∈ I Rn
+ such that

i yi = vu(g),
and yi >u i(g) implies i ∈ N(g). There exists an equilibriumwhere g is formed and payoﬀs
are y.
Corollary 4 Consider the contingent version of the indirect transfer network formation
game, and any u. Any eﬃcient network such that disconnected players earn zero payoﬀs is
supportable. Moreover, there is an equilibriumsupporting each allocation y ∈ I Rn
+ such that

i yi = vu(g) and yi > 0 implies i ∈ N(g).
9The y’s in Proposition 7 are required to be nonnegative. One can also support the networks from
Proposition 6 that are not covered in this Proposition through the construction used there. The diﬀerence
is that here one sometimes needs a player not in N(g) to subsidize the formation of a component that has a
negative value to its members. For this to work, it must be that the disconnected player earns a nonnegative
payoﬀ, or they would withdraw their subsidies. Rather than break this into separate cases, we have simply
worked with the assumption of nonnegative payoﬀs.
20Pairwise Equilibria with Contingent Transfers
Propositions 6 and 7 have counterparts for pairwise equilibrium,10 provided the network
being supported is eﬃcient and there are nonnegative externalities. This is a simple extension
of Lemma 1.
7 Transfers to Prevent Link Formation
We can see fromthe following exam ple, that in cases with negative externalities; even indirect
transfers and contingent payments are not enough to support an eﬃcient network as a
pairwise equilibrium.
Example 6 Negative Externalities and Ineﬃcient Pairwise Equilibria
Consider a society with four players. If one link forms, the two involved players each get










All other networks lead to a payoﬀ of 0.
Here, the only pairwise equilibria are ineﬃcient.11 Two players who are completely
disconnected would always beneﬁt fromform ing a link, and there is no way to give them
10In order to deﬁne pairwise equilibrium, allow players i and j to vary their announcements ti
ij(g) for all
g.
11The eﬃcient network is supportable as an equilibrium, where the two disconnected players fail to form
a link because each demands too large a transfer. This, again, is a case where pairwise equilibrium is a
reasonable reﬁnement.
21incentives not to fromthe eﬃcient network. Here, two players who forma link would like to
pay the other players not to forma link.
A Game with Payments to Prevent Link Formation
As we saw in the last example, the ability to pay players not to forma link can help in
supporting eﬃcient networks as pairwise equilibria in the presence of negative externalities.
Let us explore such a game.
We ﬁrst describe the game in the case without contingencies. Consider the indirect link
formation game, with the following modiﬁcation. Each player announces two transfers per





jk. Again, these must be nonnegative if i/ ∈ jk, and can be anything otherwise.
Player i also announces mi
j ∈{ +,−} for each j  = i. The interpretation is that i is declaring
whether the default decision on link ij is not to add ij or to add ij.
In particular, g(t,m) is determined as follows.
• If mi
j  = m
j



































For this game, equilibrium is again pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and pairwise equilib-
riumalso considers joint deviations by a pair of players ij on their announcements relative












The contingent version of the game is the version where the ti and mi
j’s are announced
as a function of g.
To see how the game deﬁned above allows payments to prevent link formation, reconsider
Example 6.
Example 7 Negative Externalities with Payments to Prevent Links
Consider the payoﬀ function of Example 6. Let us ﬁnd a pairwise equilibrium of the
game with payments not to form links that supports an eﬃcient network. Let us support the
eﬃcient network {12}. Have all players set t
i+









34 ({12})=−1/2, and m3
34(g)=m4
34(g)=− for all g,a n dmi
ij(g)=+
otherwise. For any other transfers set ti·
ij(g)=−2, and ti·
jk(g)=0w h e ni/ ∈ jk.
Here, players 1 and 2 pay players 3 and 4 if the link 34 is not formed. It is straightforward
to check that this is a pairwise equilibrium.
22Proposition 8 In the contingent gam e with indirect transfers to formor not to formlinks,
any eﬃcient network is supportable via pairwise equilibrium.
[[Add the proof to the appendix: start with an equilibriumthat supports the eﬃcient
network with contingent payments and indirect transfers. Alter this to pay to prevent any
links that would beneﬁt fromform ing. Also handle case where payoﬀs to disconnected players
might be ¡0.]]
8 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that ...
9 Relation of Supportable Equilibria to Pairwise Sta-
bility
In this section, we compare the networks that are supportable via direct transfers to pair-
wise stability concepts that identify networks that are supportable without any transfers.
This gives some feeling for the diﬀerences between transfer-based solutions and ones where
payments are ﬁxed.
The following deﬁnitions identify networks that are stable when the payoﬀs are ﬁxed
before the formation process.12
An e t w o r kg is pairwise stable with respect to a proﬁle of utility functions u if
(i) for all i and ij ∈ g, ui(g) ≥ ui(g − ij), and
(ii) for all ij / ∈ g,i fui(g + ij) >u i(g)t h e nuj(g + ij) <u j(g).
This is a self-evident solution concept that requires that no player beneﬁt by severing a
link and no two players beneﬁt by adding one.
An e t w o r kg is strongly pairwise stable with respect to a proﬁle of utility functions u if
(i) for all i and   ⊂ Li(g), ui(g) ≥ ui(g \  ), and
(ii) for all ij / ∈ g,i fui(g + ij) >u i(g)t h e nuj(g + ij) <u j(g).
12The ﬁrst two deﬁnitions are from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Strong pairwise stability is discussed
by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996, section 5), but is not named.
23This solution concept is stronger than pairwise stability in that it allows players to sever
sets of links rather than just considering one link at a time.
The next deﬁnition is a way of incorporating transfers into the study of network formation
without actually modeling the bargaining process explicitly.13
An e t w o r kg is pairwise stable with transfers with respect to a proﬁle of functions u if
(i) ij ∈ g ⇒ ui(g)+uj(g) ≥ ui(g − ij)+uj(g − ij), and
(ii) ij / ∈ g ⇒ ui(g)+uj(g) ≤ ui(g − ij)+uj(g − ij).
Part (ii) captures the idea that there are no two players who could add a link between
them, together with some transfers, and both be better oﬀ. Part (i) captures the idea that
if a link is in the network, then there must be some transfer (possibly 0) for which both
players do not wish to delete the link.
While the notions of pairwise stability and strong pairwise stability can diﬀer quite a bit
fromthe equilibria of the direct transfer gam e, the notion of pairwise stability with transfers
captures some of the spirit of the equilibria of the direct transfer game.
Proposition 9 The set of networks supportable as pairwise equilibria is exactly the inter-
section of those networks that are supportable via the direct transfer game and the networks
that are pairwise stable with transfers.
The relationship between supportable networks, pairwise equilibria, and the other pair-
wise stability concepts is outlined in the following proposition. The relationships between
the solution concepts that are outlined in Proposition 10 are captured in the following Venn
diagram.
13This diﬀers from the concept of pairwise stability allowing for side payments that is discussed by Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996). That concept had a stronger requirement in (i), requiring that ui(g) ≥ ui(g − ij)a n d
uj(g) ≥ uj(g−ij). If transfers are possible in sustaining a network, and not just in deviations, then arguably







(i) The set of pairwise equilibria is a subset of the set of equilibria.
(ii) If a network g is strongly pairwise stable relative to a proﬁle of utility functions u,t h e n
it is supportable via the direct transfer game and it is pairwise stable.
(iii) There exist u and g for which g is strongly pairwise stable (and thus pairwise stable
and supportable), but not supportable via pairwise equilibrium.
(iv) There exist u and g for which g is supported via pairwise equilibrium(and thus sup-
portable) and pairwise stable but not strongly pairwise stable.
(v) There are networks that are supportable and not pairwise stable nor supportable via
pairwise equilibrium.
(vi) There are networks that are pairwise stable and not supportable (nor supportable via
pairwise equilibrium, nor strongly pairwise stable).
(vii) There are networks that are both supportable and pairwise stable, but not strongly pair-
wise stable nor supportable via pairwise equilibrium.
(viii) There are networks that are supportable via pairwise equilibriumand not pairwise sta-
ble.
25(ix) There exist networks that are strongly pairwise stable (and thus pairwise stable) and at
the same time supported via pairwise equilibrium (and thus supportable).
Proof of Proposition 10: (i) follows fromthe deﬁnition of pairwise equilibrium . The
pairwise stable part of (ii) is direct. To see the other part of (ii), set ti
ij = t
j
ij = 0 for each
ij ∈ g,a n dti
ij = −X for each ij / ∈ g, for some X>0. For large enough X this forms an
equilibrium. To see (iii), consider the empty network in Example 9. To see (iv), see Example
10. To see (v), consider the empty network in Example 1. To see (vi), see Example 8. To
see (vii), see Example 11. To see (viii), see Example 9. To see (ix), see the complete network
in Example 1.
The examples illustrating the claims in Proposition 10 are as follows.
























































u2 = −4 u2 = −4
u1 =1
































































u2 = −4 u2 = −4
u1 =2
All other networks have value of 0. The network {12,23} is supportable via pairwise
equilibriumand pairwise stable but not strongly pairwise stable.
Example 11 Supportable and Pairwise Stable but not Strongly Pairwise Stable nor Sup-
portable via Pairwise Equilibrium
This is the same as Example 10, except that the complete network leads to u1 =6 ,
u2 = −3, and u3 = −1. The network {12,23} is still supportable and pairwise stable, but
no longer supportable via pairwise equilibrium.
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11 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The network g is supported via an equilibriumof the direct
transfer network formation game relative to the proﬁle of utility functions u if and only if








ij ≥ 0 for all ij ∈ g.
Furthermore, we know that in equilibrium, we cannot have ti
ij + t
j
ij > 0 for any ij,a s
then either one of the players would strictly beneﬁt by lowering their ti
ij.14















ij ≥ 0∀ij ∈ g







The dual of this problemis 15
max{µi





 mui(g, ) subject to

 ⊂Li(g):ij∈  µi
  − νij = −1, for all ordered pairs i ∈ N and ij ∈ g,a n d
µi
  ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and   ⊂ Li(g), νij ≥ 0 for all ij ∈ g.
Since we are free to choose any the νij’s do not appear in the objective function, this
problemis equivalent to
max{µi





 mui(g, ) subject to

 ⊂Li(g):ij∈  µi
  − νij =

 ⊂Lj(g):ij∈  µ
j
  − νij for all ordered pairs i ∈ N and ij ∈ g,a n d
14We can set ti
ij = t
j
ij = −X for some large enough scalar X for any ij / ∈ g, to complete the speciﬁcation
of the equilibrium strategies.









ij are both nonnegative.
Working across the two inequalities generated by each one of these, we ﬁnd the equality to -1.
29µi
  ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and   ⊂ Li(g).
As the objective can be set to 0 by setting all of the µi





 mui(g, ) is at least 0 for all sets of µi
 ’s that satisfy the constraints. The con-
straints correspond to the deﬁnition of balanced weights, and thus the proposition follows.
Proof of Proposition 2: Given Propositions 10 and 1, the ﬁrst statement follows directly.
Thus, the result follows from Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider t supporting g in either game. In the indirect transfer game,
for any ij / ∈ g and k/ ∈ ij, without loss of generality rearrange transfers so that tk
ij =0 .S i n c e
g is eﬃcient, and satisﬁes nonnegative externalities, it must be that ui(g+ij)+uj(g+ij) ≤
ui(g)+uj(g), and so mui(g,ij)+muj(g,ij) ≤ 0. Given that tk
ij = 0 for all k/ ∈ ij, it follows
that any joint deviation by i and j on ij that leads to an improvement for one player, must
lead to a loss for the other player.




As the game has nonpositive externalities, this implies that for all links muk(g,ij) ≤ 0 for
all k  = i,j. Hence, mui(g,ij)+muj(g,ij) ≥ 0. Now by convexity in own-links, mui(g, ) ≥
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  + muj(g,ij)
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 ⊂Li(g):ij∈  µi
  =

  ⊂Lj(g):ij∈   µ
j











which is the required balance condition.
The Second statement obtains from Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 3:(i) Given that f(2) <f(1)−c, any two players who are not directly
connected will improve their utilities, and thus the total value, by forming a link.
(ii) and (iii). Consider g ,ac o mp o n e n to f g containing m players. Let k ≥ m − 1b et h e
number of links in this component. The value of these direct links is k(2f(1) − 2c). This
leaves at most m(m − 1)/2 − k indirect links. The value of each indirect link is at most
2f(2). Therefore, the overall value of the component is at most
k(2f(1) − 2c)+( m(m − 1) − 2k)f(2). (1)
30If this component is a star then its value would be
(m − 1)(2f(1) − 2c)+( m − 1)(m − 2)f(2). (2)
Notice that
(1) − (2) = (k − (m − 1))(2f(1) − 2c − 2f(2)),
, which is at most 0 since k ≥ m−1a n dc>f(1)−f(2), and less than 0 if k>m−1. The
value of this component can equal the value of the star only when k = m − 1. Any network
with k = m − 1, which is not a star, must have an indirect connection which has a path
longer than 2, getting value at most 2f(2). Therefore, the value of the indirect links will be
below (m − 1)(m − 2)f(2), which is what we get with star.
We have shown that if c>f(1) − f(2), then any component of a eﬃcient network must
be a star. Note that any component of a eﬃcient network must have nonnegative value.
In that case, a direct calculation using (2) shows that a single star of m + m  individuals
is greater in value than separate stars of m and m  players. Thus if the eﬃcient graph is
nonempty, it must consist of a single star. Again, it follows from (2) that if a star of n
players has nonnegative value, then a star of n + 1 players has higher value. Finally, to
complete (ii) and (iii) notice that a star encompassing everyone has positive value only when
f(1) +
(n−2)
2 f(2) >c .




ij = −X and tk
ij = 0 for k/ ∈ ij,w h e r eX is suﬃciently large to be exceed the largest
marginal utility of any agent for any set of links. If ij ∈ g, by eﬃciency

k muk(g,ij) ≥ 0. If
muk(g,ij) ≥ 0 for all k set all the transfers tk
ij =0 .I fmui(g,ij) < 0 and/or muj(g,ij) < 0
then set the corresponding ti
ij and or t
j
ij equal to the marginal utility, and then for each k
such that muk(g,ij) > 0s e ttk
ij ∈ [0,mu k(g,ij)] so that

l ti
ij = 0. This is possible by the
eﬃciency of g.
These t are such that for any ij ∈ g, mul(g,ij) ≥ tl
ij whenever l ∈ ij or l/ ∈ ij and tl
ij > 0.
Let us argue that this forms an equilibrium of the indirect transfer game.
First, note that by the deﬁnition of X, if there exists an improving deviation, there will
exist one that only changes t’s on links in g.
By convexity in all links, if there exists a deviation that is improving for some l on tl on
some set of links, then there exists some deviation that involves at most one link tl
ij,w i t h
the possibility that l ∈ ij.F o r ij ∈ g, increasing transfers is costly and does not change
the outcome. Reducing transfers implies that the link will not be formed. Such a deviation
cannot be proﬁtable as mul(g,ij)−tl
ij ≥ 0i fl ∈ ij or if l/ ∈ ij and tl
ij > 0. It is not possible
to lower tl
ij below 0 if l/ ∈ ij.
The last claimin the Proposition follows fromLem m a 1.




i∈N(g ) yi for all g  ∈ C(g), and
yi  = ui(g) implies i ∈ N(g) follow fromthe balance of transfers across com ponents and the
observation that in equilibriumthe transfers will sumto 0 on any link that is form ed.
31To complete the proof, let us show that any such network g and allocation y can be
supported as an equilibrium.
Let Y =2ma x {maxi |yi|;max i,g  |ui(g )|}.
For g   = g,s e tti
ij(g )=−Y for all i and j.
For g, set transfers as follows. For any ij / ∈ g set ti
ij = t
j
ij = −Y .
For ij ∈ g we set transfers as follows.
Consider a component g  ∈ C(g).
Find a tree h ⊂ g  such that N(h)=N(g ).16
Let player i be a root of the tree.17 Consider each j who has just one link in the tree.
T h e r ei sau n i q u ep a t hf r o mj to i. Let this path be the network h  = {i1i2,...,i K−1iK},
where j = i1 and i = iK.















yik  − uik (g)

Do this for each path in the tree.




Under these transfers, g will be the network that forms and y will be the payoﬀ vector.
Let us check that there are no improving deviations.
Consider a deviation that leads to another network g   = ∅ being formed. This must
involve a net loss for any i as i’s payoﬀ must be below ui(g )−Y . Next, consider a deviation
that leads to the empty network. It must be that that the deviating player is i ∈ N(g)i n
which case the new payoﬀ is 0 for i, which cannot be improving as yi ≥ 0. So, consider a
deviation by a player i that still leads to g being formed. Player i’s promises ti
ij(g) can only
have increased, which can only lower i’s payoﬀ.
Proof of Proposition 7:
Let Y =2ma x {maxi |yi|;max i,g  |ui(g )|}.
For g   = g,s e tti
ij(g )=−Y for all i and j, and set ti
jk(g ) = 0 for i/ ∈ jk.
For g, set transfers as follows. Let A = {i|yi >u i(g)} and B = {i|yi <u i(g)}.
For i ∈ A let  i(g) be the number of links that i has in g.S e tti
ij(g)=
−yi+ui(g)
 i(g) if ij ∈ g
and set ti
ij(g)=−Y if ij / ∈ g,a n dti
jk =0o t h e r w i s e .
16A tree is a network that consists of a single component and has no cycles (paths such that every player
with a link in the path has two links in the path).
17A root of the tree is a player who lies on any path that connects any two players who each have just one
link in the tree.
18For k = 1 only the second equation applies, and for k = K only the ﬁrst applies.




j∈B uj(g) − yj
.


















if jk ∈ g, j ∈ A and k/ ∈ A,
= −Y if jk / ∈ g and i ∈ jk, and
=0o t h e r w i s e .
For i/ ∈ A ∪ B,s e tti
ij = −Y if ij / ∈ g and ti
jk = 0, otherwise.
Under these transfers, g will be the network that forms and y will be the payoﬀ vector.
Let us check that there are no improving deviations.
Consider a deviation that leads to another network g   = ∅ being formed. This must
involve a net loss for any i as i’s payoﬀ must be below ui(g ) − Y . Next, we consider a
deviation by a player i that leads to the empty network. This cannot be improving as
yi ≥ 0. So, consider a deviation by a player i that still leads to g being formed. Player i’s
promises ti
jk(g) can only have increased, which can only lower i’s payoﬀ.
Proof of Proposition 9: It is clear that the set of pairwise equilibria is a subset of the
set of equilibria of the direct transfer game. Let us show that any network supportable as a
pairwise equilibriumis also pairwise stable with transfers. Consider a pairwise equilibrium
 t. For any link ij ∈ g,p l a y e ri prefers to announce  ti




ij < 0. Hence, ui(g)−  ti
ij ≥ ui(g − ij). Similarly, uj(g)−
 t
j
ij ≥ ui(g − ij). Summing up









ui(g)+uj(g) ≥ ui(g − ij)+uj(g − ij). Conversely, suppose that ij / ∈ g. If ui(g)+uj(g) >
ui(g − ij)+uj(g − ij), deﬁne a new transfer vector 	 t where 	 th
kl =  th
kl for all kl  = ij and
	 ti
ij = ui(g)−ui(g−ij)−ε, 	 t
j
ij = uj(g)−uj(g−ij)−ε where ε is chosen so that 	 ti
ij+	 t
j
ij ≥ 0. It























jk, contradicting the deﬁnition
of pairwise equilibrium.
Finally, let us argue that any network g that is supportable and is also pairwise stable
with transfers is supportable as a pairwise equilibrium. Consider an equilibrium  t that
supports g. We argue that  t must also be a pairwise equilibrium. Suppose to the contrary
that there exists some ij / ∈ g such that





ik −  t
i












jk −  t
j






with one inequality holding strictly, and where  ti
ij +  t
j
ij ≥ 0 (as otherwise the link ij does
not formand the payoﬀs could not have changed). Thus,
ui(g + ij) −  t
i




ij +  t
j
ij ≥ 0 it follows that
ui(g + ij)+uj(g + ij) >u i(g)+uj(g),
which contradicts the fact that g is pairwise stable with transfers.
34